https://weiweizheng.eu.org/tag/talent/TalentWowchemy (https://wowchemy.com)en-usFri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000https://weiweizheng.eu.org/media/icon_huf75c31f7b1ffb44b6ccc780dfca295cb_47183_512x512_fill_lanczos_center_3.pnghttps://weiweizheng.eu.org/tag/talent/https://weiweizheng.eu.org/publication/ssrn/Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 +0000https://weiweizheng.eu.org/publication/ssrn/<style> body { text-align: justify} </style> <p>Abstract: We examine how Chinese firms compete for high-skilled talent using novel text-based product market competitor networks and job posting data. We document strong strategic complementarity: a one unit increase in rivals&rsquo; high-skilled postings raises a firm&rsquo;s own postings by 0.6, generating a multiplier of 2.5. This competition is product-market driven, national in scope, and absent for low-skilled workers. Crucially, the strength of strategic complementarity increases with the downside risk of falling behind. A theoretical model shows complementarity arises when the fear of falling behind outweighs the gain from leading. Our results indicate that talent competition amplifies labor demand and is a central channel for product-market rivalry. <br/> <br/> Keywords: strategic complementarity, DMP, peer effects, competition network</p>